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FOREWORD
The attacks on New York and Washington on
September 11, 2001, enhanced the importance of both
the South Caucasus and Central Asia to American
security. Overflight rights through the Caucasus to
Central Asia and Afghanistan are vital components
of the ongoing military effort there by both U.S. and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces.
Therefore the security dynamics in each of these areas
are of heightened importance to U.S. policy. But the
Transcaucasus is a region of multiple conflicts and
fault-lines. Three of the four so-called “frozen conflicts”
in the former Soviet Union are to be found there and
are not as frozen as they may look. Indeed, as multiple
recent crises show, Russo-Georgian tensions connected
with South Ossetia and Abkhazia—two of the frozen
conflicts—could erupt into open violence at any time.
For these reasons, this monograph by Dr. Svante
Cornell of the Central Asia Caucasus Institute of Johns
Hopkins University is exceptionally timely. Presented
as part of the Strategic Studies Institute conference
cosponsored with the University of Washington’s
Ellison Center for Russian, East European, and Central
Asian Studies; the Pacific Northwest Center for Global
Security; and the Institute for Global and Regional
Security Studies in April 2006, this monograph
outlines the possibilities for conflict in the region and
the qualities that make it a strategically important
one, not only for Washington and Moscow, but also
increasingly for Europe.
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Since its independence, Georgia has been the most
vocally independent-minded country in the former
Soviet Union. Russia countered Georgia’s independence by strong support for secessionist minorities such
as those in Abkhazia and south Ossetia. Since President
Vladimir Putin’s coming to power, Russian pressure on
Georgia to reverse its pro-Western course has grown
measurably. Following the 2003 Rose Revolution in
Georgia, relations with Russia turned sour as the
new government proved both democratic and singlemindedly focused on rebuilding the Georgian state,
resolving the secessionist conflicts, and seeking NATO
membership—all anathema to Moscow.
The security and success of Georgia is very
important to Western interests in general and to those
of the United States in particular. Beyond the hope
that Georgia represents for successful state-building
and democratic development in both the former Soviet
Union and the wider Middle East, this country is a key
strategic pivot for the transportation of Eurasia’s energy
resources, as well as for western access to Central Asia
and Afghanistan.
Moscow is moving toward a creeping annexation
of sovereign Georgian territory, and in the process is
undermining confidence-building between Georgia
and its secessionist minorities and increasing the
danger of a military flare-up. Beyond this, Moscow has
tried to squeeze Georgia’s economy by manipulating
energy supplies, instigating a wholesale trade and
transport embargo, and deporting ethnic Georgians
from Russia. These measures distract Georgia from
its reform process, though Russia so far has failed to
achieve its purposes.


Faced with this situation, the United States needs to
develop a coherent and proactive rather than reactive
policy toward the region. This must first include a
reassessment of relations with Russia. Moreover, a
strategic approach to Georgia should include continued
support for Georgia’s reforms; increased support
for the internationalization of the peacekeeping and
negotiation structures in Georgia’s conflicts; and
measures to support increased trade relations with
Georgia to provide for alternative markets. All these
will be possible only through a strengthened U.S.
commitment to Georgia’s NATO membership, greater
cooperation with European partners, and, not least,
improved coordination among the various agencies
of the U.S. Government with regard to initiatives
concerning this country.
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GEORGIA AFTER THE ROSE REVOLUTION:
GEOPOLITICAL PREDICAMENT AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Since perestroika, Georgia has been the most vocally
independent-minded country in the former Soviet
Union. In the late Soviet period, it had the strongest
move toward independence; in the early 1990s, it was
the state most adamantly rejecting membership in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); later, it
remained the most pro-western state of the CIS, making
NATO membership a stated ambition before any other
post-Soviet state. In this sense, Georgia bears more
similarities to the Baltic states than to its neighbors or
other CIS members. The difference is that the Baltic
states managed to achieve their objectives with only
verbal and political Russian objections, whereas in
Georgia, Moscow has used many more elements of
its power to prevent Georgia from following the same
path.
Indeed, Russia consistently has supported armed
secessionist movements against Georgia, helping them
secede in the early 1990s and backing them militarily
and politically since then. Russia for over a decade
refused to withdraw its unwanted military bases from
Georgian territory; bombed Georgian territory at
several occasions; accused Georgia on bogus charges of
harboring terrorists targeting Russia; used subversive
measures, including attempts to assassinate Georgia’s
head of state; imposed a discriminatory visa regime on
the country; and applied economic pressure through
its use of Georgia’s energy dependence on Russia. Most
recently, Moscow has had serving Russian security
personnel appointed to key positions in unrecognized



states on Georgian territory, and instituted politically
motivated boycotts of Georgian exports to Russia.
Given these measures, Russia’s foreign policy toward
Georgia stands out in comparison with virtually all
other parts of the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR). If Moscow increasingly has sought
to reestablish its control over its former dominions,
nowhere has it been more ready and willing to bare its
teeth to achieve this goal than in Georgia; and nowhere
has Moscow displayed a more contemptuous attitude
toward the basic principles of international law
than it has in Georgia. It deserves to be restated that
Russia’s interventionist policies have included the use
and the threat of the use of violence, subversion, and
what amounts to the outright annexation of Georgian
territory. These are far from normal instruments of
international politics; indeed, they are extreme.
This Russian policy has had serious consequences
for Georgia’s quest for political and economic
development and its stability and security. A small
country with considerable internal problems, Georgia
has been unable to focus on its development, given
the constant pressure and manipulations from
Moscow geared at changing Georgia’s policies. As
far as the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are
concerned, Russian policies have undermined directly
the integrity, unity, and functioning of the Georgian
states and contributed to a deep political, economic
and psychological malaise in Georgian society. Indeed,
even if these conflicts arose out of genuine grievances
on the part of minority populations and serious
mistakes on the part of the Georgian leadership,
Russia’s influence over the secessionist regions has
grown so strong that it has changed the nature of
these conflicts. Indeed, given that the current situation



amounts to Russia’s de facto annexation of Georgian
territory, there is reason to pose the question whether
these conflicts, even if they began as intercommunal
conflicts, still are essentially secessionist civil wars, or
whether they are best described as outright RussianGeorgian confrontations by proxy.
Nevertheless, Russian pressure seemed only to
embolden Georgia in its determination to secure a
future outside Russian control. Consecutive Georgian
governments have followed principally the same
foreign policy priority: to seek integration with EuroAtlantic institutions and direct security ties with the
United States in order to achieve some level of protection
from Moscow. This has taken place at a time when the
United States increasingly has been identifying growing
security interests in the South Caucasus, and Georgia
in particular. Long one of the most liberal and open
countries in the former Soviet space, situated along the
east-west corridor linking Europe to the Caspian sea,
and a major transit state for U.S. operations in Central
Asia, America’s commitment to Georgian independence and sovereignty has grown considerably since the
early 1990s. This U.S. commitment has grown in spite
of continuing tendencies of some forces, particularly
in the State Department, to deal with Russia over
Georgia’s head. Indeed, Georgia’s independent stance
likely would not have been possible without Western,
and in particular American, support for the country.
Growth of assertive Russian neo-imperial policies
following the democratic revolutions in Georgia
and Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin’s increasing
authoritarian control over the country, and the security
services’ dominance over the state apparatus, coupled
with the increasing liquidity of Russia given high oil
prices, have made Russian and American interests in



Eurasia increasingly incompatible. Indeed, Russia’s
active and ultimately successful lobbying for the
removal of U.S. military forces from Uzbekistan in 2005
showed with all necessary clarity that Russia is viewing
relations with the United States in Eurasia in zero-sum
terms. Conversely, America has been following a winwin approach, trying to convince Russian leaders of
the common interests advanced by America’s activity
in the region, most notably Afghanistan. It also is clear
that the South Caucasus, and Georgia specifically, is
becoming a key point of contention in this situation.
Several questions arise out of this discussion. A first
is to define the stakes in the South Caucasus and where
Georgia fits into this picture. A second is to understand
the basis and context of Russian policies towards
Georgia. And a third is to analyze the implications of
this conundrum for American policy in the region.
WHAT IS AT STAKE IN GEORGIA?
Georgia may not necessarily be the most strategically
important country in the South Caucasus. That title
clearly must be attributed to Azerbaijan, given its
larger size; its status as the only country bordering
both Russia and Iran, and thereby unavoidable in
any east-west corridor; its energy resources; and its
uniqueness as a secular, modern Shi’a Muslim country.
Indeed, in his 1997 The Grand Chessboard, Zbigniew
Brzezinski termed Azerbaijan, along with Ukraine
and Uzbekistan, strategic pivots. If it is not the most
strategic country, Georgia is the most critical country
in the South Caucasus. In strategic terms, this relates
to the crucial role it plays in linking the Caspian Sea
and Azerbaijan with the West. As Vladimir Socor has
put it, “Georgia and Azerbaijan can only function as a



tandem or not at all; they stand or fall together.”1 And
its very weakness makes it the target of Russian policies.
Indeed, control over Georgia either allows or prohibits
the development of an east-west link connecting Europe
with the Caspian in terms of energy, transportation,
and consequently also economic and political stability.
Georgia hence is crucial to Western energy and security
interests in Eurasia. Moreover, given the increasing
Western emphasis on freedom and democracy, the
2003 Rose Revolution added an ideological element to
Georgia’s role in Eurasia, namely a stake in the survival
and development of Georgian democracy. In this sense,
Georgia is important in the three “baskets” of American
interests that are discernible in the region. From the
“softer” to the “harder,” these include sovereignty and
democracy, energy and trade, and security.
Sovereignty, Governance and Democracy.
Even before the Rose Revolution, Georgia rightly
was considered one of the most liberal states in the
former Soviet Union. Aside from a permissive political
climate and high levels of freedom of expression,
Georgia was one of the few countries where media
freedom included the existence of television channels
uncontrolled by the state. Georgia’s liberal character
depended partly on the progressive nature of the
government. Moreover, much as in the case of
Kyrgyzstan, Georgia’s strong economic and political
dependence on the West made it malleable to western
demands for democratization and respect for human
rights. But the liberal atmosphere depended equally
on the utter weakness of the Georgian state. Indeed,
the Shevardnadze government’s inability to control
Georgia’s territory or its own state institutions



effectively precluded it from exercising a greater degree
of control over Georgian society. The corollary of this
reality was the level of corruption in the country, which
in its anarchic and uncontrolled nature formed a larger
impediment to the country’s development than more
structured and hierarchic corruption in neighboring
Azerbaijan.
By 2000, this situation posed a clear and present danger
to Georgia’s security. The Shevardnadze administration
was unable or unwilling to prevent the emergence of
independent forces in the government that accumulated
large amounts of capital and power and showed it
ostentatiously; and apparently little was done to rein
them in. Hence Interior Minister Kakha Targamadze,
Security Minister Vakhtang Kutateladze, Economy
Minister Ivane Chkhartishvili, and others grew into
uncontrollable forces in the Shevardnadze government
that contributed greatly to the increasing popular
disillusionment, and alienated the young reformers in the government who eventually would carry
out the 2003 Rose Revolution that brought down
the government. Thanks to the interior and security
ministers’ permissive attitude, the Pankisi Gorge in
North-Central Georgia was, for most of the late 1990s,
a no-go zone in which armed Chechen groupings and
criminal networks based themselves with impunity.
Indeed, even with massive popular demonstrations
against the attempts by the three ministers to curtail
freedom of speech in 2001, it was only excessive pressure from the United States that forced Shevardnadze
to remove the three ministers.2 Likewise, only as a
result of intense international pressure and American
assistance did Georgia’s national security ministry,
through the efforts of then First Deputy Minister Irakli
Alasania, succeed in bringing the Pankisi Gorge back
under control in 2002.3


The Rose Revolution occurred very much as a result
of the corruption, incompetence, and criminalization
of the Georgian state. The opposition troika that
led the revolution—Mikheil Saakashvili, Nino
Burjanadze, and Zurab Zhvania—were all former
Shevardnadze protégés who left the government due to
Shevardnadze’s unwillingness to part with the corrupt
old guard and enforce meaningful reforms. Saakashvili
then successfully marketed Georgia as a “beacon of
democracy” in the post-Soviet space. Indeed, the Rose
Revolution came at a time of increasing frustration
with the stagnant political development in Eurasia.
Authoritarian backsliding in Russia, Ukraine, Central
Asia, and the Caucasus had dashed many hopes about
the democratic future of the region and proven the
“transition paradigm” wrong.4 In Moscow, and in
Central Asian capitals, the Georgian revolution was
greeted with fear and dismay, showing how tenuous
the hold of unpopular leaders over power could be. Not
surprisingly, Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan reacted most
vociferously to the developments, acutely aware that
his situation was the most similar to Shevardnadze’s.
Indeed, he was deposed little more than a year later.
But it was the Ukrainian “orange revolution” that
really shook the region and prompted Moscow to
action. Yet it also showed the importance of Georgia’s
experience: Aside from the giant new Georgian flags
waving throughout the demonstrations in Kyiv, it
was clear that the success of the revolution in Georgia
emboldened the Ukrainian opposition to unity and a
peaceful course to regime change.
These developments coincided with the increasing
emphasis on freedom and democracy on the part of
the Bush administration. President George W. Bush’s
second inaugural address marked the promotion of



democracy in the wider Middle East as an important
element of official U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, President
Bush’s May 2005 visit to Tbilisi—the first ever of a U.S.
President to Central Asia or the Caucasus—marked
the importance given by the administration to Georgia
as a “beacon of democracy” in the wider region. In this
light, Georgia is symbolically important to the prestige
and image of the United States in the region.
This is further accentuated by the hangover that
has been spreading throughout the region by what
increasingly is viewed as American naivety regarding
democracy-building. The Ukrainian revolution did not
yield the expected results, with Yushchenko’s coalition
rapidly crumbling; Kyrgyzstan’s revolution by now
generally is understood as a setback rather than a
success;5 and the election of Hamas in the Palestinian
Authority sent shockwaves of doubt regarding the
wisdom of democracy-promotion, especially in the
Muslim world. While these events all highlight the
importance of building state institutions rather than
simply holding fair elections, they do put into question
the U.S. policy of pushing aggressively for democratic
reform. This increases the U.S. stakes in the Georgian
revolution. The survival of a sovereign, prosperous
Georgian state where democracy is deepened and
institutionalized becomes an important symbolical
element in the promotion of U.S. interests. Should
Georgia fail, then the U.S. image in Eurasia and the
wider Middle East will be discredited further.
Energy and Trade.
In geo-economic terms, Georgia also is crucial
in the wider project of building an East-West transportation corridor. This corridor is associated most



widely with oil and gas pipelines, but carries much
larger significance. Indeed, the Caucasus for the past
decade has been viewed as a major opportunity to
create a transit route connecting Europe to Central
Asia, China, and India via the Black Sea, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea. While presently
limited, the potential for continental trade to develop
across this route is enormous. Georgia and Azerbaijan
are the key bridge countries in this regard, on which
the East-West corridor depends. The building of a
railroad connecting Kars in Turkey to Akhalkalaki in
Georgia, and the rehabilitation of the AkhalkalakiTbilisi rail line, combined with existing railroads, will
connect Istanbul to the Caspian sea. Together with
the building of rail lines linking Kazakhstan to China,
this creates a rail connection from Istanbul to China,
making it possible to ship goods fast and relatively
inexpensively across Asia.6 The importance of this
transportation corridor was recognized implicitly by
the European Union’s (EU) Transportation Corridor
Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) program in the
mid-1990s. Unfortunately, the EU did not follow up
this initiative properly. Yet the economic growth and
relative stability of the Caucasus and Central Asia in
the past several years have provided renewed hope for
the development of this transport corridor.
More obvious has been the development of a
Caucasian energy corridor. In the late 1990s, the
pipeline politics in Eurasia made it much less than
obvious that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline
would be built. Nevertheless, due to the consistent
commitment by American, British, Turkish, Georgian,
and Azerbaijani governments; the increase of oil
prices; and the support of the major oil companies; the
pipeline eventually was decided on and constructed.



This signified a major victory for the Americansponsored concept of multiple pipelines, serving to
deny any one state a monopoly over Caspian energy
exports. It should be noted that this policy never
sought to exclude Russia: Quite to the contrary, one of
the three pipeline projects sponsored by Washington
was the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which linked
the Kazakhstani city of Tengiz with Russia’s Black
Sea Port of Novorossiysk. The third pipeline, the only
one that has yet to be realized, was the Trans-Caspian
gas pipeline linking Turkmenistan to Europe over the
Caucasus. The construction of the BTC pipeline was a
milestone in the region’s development and specifically
in connecting it, factually and psychologically, with
Europe’s economy and security.7 In an environment of
increasing demand for energy with decreasing growth
in oil production, the BTC pipeline brings muchneeded energy resources to Europe at a critical time.
Just as Europe is waking up to the risks involved in its
energy dependence on Russia, this makes the Caucasus
increasingly important to global economic and energy
security, and specifically crucial for Europe.
BTC has been followed by the construction of the
South Caucasus Gas Pipeline (SCP) linking the ShahDeniz gas fields in the Caspian with the Turkish energy
system. This pipeline is crucial to Georgia’s future
energy security as it will reduce Georgian dependence
on Russian gas; but it also increases the importance of
the South Caucasus, and thereby Georgia, in regional
energy security by making it a conduit not only of oil,
but also of gas.
Finally, the completion of the BTC pipeline and the
finalization of the SCP pipeline changes the realities
of the transportation systems of the region. If, a few
years ago, connecting Central Asian energy resources
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with Europe seemed utopian, the completion of BTC
and SCP makes this prospect utterly realistic: Energy
transportation networks that link to Europe are now
available on the west coast of the Caspian, implying that
they become a real option for East Caspian producers,
including Kazakhstan’s oil and Turkmenistan’s natural
gas. Indeed, Kazakhstan already has committed to
exporting oil through an expanded BTC pipeline;
while Turkmenistan has shown a renewed interest
in gas export opportunities that are not controlled by
Russia. While the shipment of Turkmen gas would
only be possible through a Trans-Caspian pipeline,
the shipment of Kazakh oil can and is taking place
more incrementally, initially through barges across the
Caspian, to be supplanted by a pipeline if quantities
become large enough.
Since the inauguration of the BTC pipeline, the
discussion on Trans-Caspian pipelines has been
reinvigorated. The renewed European interest in
this matter makes the moment auspicious for a
second round of Caspian energy diplomacy to bring
Caspian resources westward. This, in turn, increases
the importance of the Caucasus in energy security
matters: Azerbaijan and Georgia now become not only
a producer region but potentially also a transit region
for westward-bound energy.
Security.
Soon after the smoke cleared over the Pentagon and
World Trade Center, it became clear that the United
States would pursue military action in Afghanistan.
That action substantially altered the importance in U.S.
military planning of the southern regions of the former
Soviet Union. The South Caucasus and Central Asia
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appeared indispensable for the successful prosecution
of war in the heart of Asia. The former Central Asian
republics, in particular Uzbekistan, became crucial
for the basing of troops, for intelligence, and for
humanitarian cooperation, as illustrated by military
bases being set up in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. All
Central Asian states, including neutral Turkmenistan,
Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, granted the
United States landing rights, refueling facilities, or
overflight rights.8 As Socor noted, these measures were
an historic breakthrough: one signifying the setting foot
of western forces in the heartland of Asia, formerly the
exclusive preserve of land empires.9
The South Caucasus states, chiefly Georgia and
Azerbaijan, equally were vital for logistical reasons.
Transporting troops and heavy materiel from NATO
territory or the mainland United States to Central
Asia posed additional political challenges. Even after
securing basing rights in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,
the U.S. Air Force still faced a virtual “Caspian
bottleneck.” Transiting U.S. military forces over or
through Iran was not an option. Russia was more willing
to cooperate, opening its airspace for humanitarian
and logistical flights, but refusing to grant the use of
Russian airspace to U.S. combat aircraft.10 This left only
the South Caucasian states—most notably Georgia and
Azerbaijan—which were among the first in the world
to support the United States in its Global War on
Terrorism.11 Their airspace was the only realistic route
through which military aircraft could be deployed
from NATO territory to Afghanistan.
This development has only been reinforced by
subsequent developments, including the 2003 war
in Iraq and the brewing confrontation between the
United States and Iran. If the South Caucasus was a
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transit route with regard to Afghanistan, the increased
focus on Iraq and Iran puts the Caucasus center stage
in the most critical security issues of the day. As an
adamantly pro-western country in the region, Georgia’s
importance to U.S. national security interests should
be obvious. In 2002, Georgia itself became a country
of U.S. military deployment. In this case, assistance
came in the form of a train-and-equip program for the
Georgian military instigated in early 2002 at the time
of a growing crisis between Tbilisi and Moscow over
the Pankisi Gorge along Georgia’s northern border
with Chechnya. America’s involvement at this point,
including the so-called “red line policy” on Georgia
that sought to halt Russian encroachment on Georgian
territory, effectively defused the brewing crisis. The
$64 million Georgia Train-and-Equip Program, first
deployed in 2002, was renewed in 2004.
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in the spring of 2003
further illustrated the importance of U.S. bases in
the region bordering the Middle East. The Turkish
parliament’s decision not to permit U.S. forces to open
a second front in northern Iraq was a stark reminder
that the United States could not take basing rights on
established allies’ territory for granted. Some suggested
Georgia might serve as a backup to Turkish bases.12
Likewise, press reports in both the West, Russia, and
Iran speculated that Azerbaijan might serve as a staging
area for U.S. operations against Iran. In general, the
pattern of U.S. global military repositioning indicates
that a patchwork of smaller, more rudimentary, and
easily upgradable military bases could develop,
including in Central Asia and the Caucasus.13
It also is important to note that Georgia, like
Azerbaijan, is not just a weak consumer of external
security assistance. By their role in the global anti-
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terror coalition and their participation in peacekeeping
missions, these two countries are positive contributors
to regional security. Georgia deploys 850 soldiers in
Iraq, making it one of the five largest contingents of
troops there; especially considering Georgia’s small
population, the contribution made, and the risk that
Georgia incurs on the international scene through its
participation, is highly significant.
Given the unrest in Iraq, the confrontation with Iran,
and the increasingly difficult American relationship
with Turkey, the South Caucasus by default becomes
a critical region of U.S. security interests, since it has
very few reliable allies in the wider region. The 2005
debacle in American-Uzbek relations, ending with the
closing of the U.S. military base at Kharshi-Khanabad,
further illustrated the predicament the United States
finds itself in trying to pursue its interests in the region.
Of course, the episode also illustrates the danger
of failing to entertain and build trust in an alliance.
Another unforeseen consequence of the Uzbekistan
debacle was a loss of U.S. position in Central Asia.
America is now left reliant on the will of the weak,
poor, and increasingly incapable Kyrgyz state to allow
an American base at Manas Airport outside Bishkek.
There is hence little doubt that the South Caucasus is
increasing in importance in the strategic realities that
the United States is facing.
U.S. INTERESTS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
The increasing importance of security in U.S.
policy towards the South Caucasus has not reduced,
but rather strengthened the other main drivers of
U.S. policy. First, support for the independence of the
regional states increasingly has become crucial. The
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experience of September 11, 2001 (9/11), is an important
lesson in this regard: The reaction and response of the
regional states of Central Asia and the Caucasus to the
terrorist acts was correlated directly to their level of
independence. States that had most strongly sought
independence from Moscow in the post-Soviet period
such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan were the
first to extend wide-ranging offers of assistance and
cooperation with the United States. On the other hand,
those that had remained most closely aligned with
Moscow, such as Armenia and Tajikistan, were much
slower to react, unable or unwilling to make decisions
independently; instead they awaited Moscow’s
reaction. Second, the importance of Caspian oil has
increased. Soaring oil prices, decreasing stockpiles,
the strengthening of hardliner power in Iran, unrest
in Iraq, and instability in Saudi Arabia and Venezuela
all have contributed to making the Caspian region
seem increasingly attractive, and indeed peaceful and
stable, as an oil supplier. Finally, the Rose Revolution
in Georgia, and the significant U.S. role in it, in a sense
have disproved the thesis that strategic engagement on
the part of the United States automatically leads to a
larger reliance on authoritarian regimes.14
U.S. relations with Azerbaijan are another indication
of this. In spite of the considerable U.S. interests in
the country, Washington, at least diplomatically, has
kept Baku at arms’ length since the 2003 elections
that brought Ilham Aliyev to power. Aliyev was not
invited to Washington until April 2006, generating
considerable dismay in Baku. Finally, the U.S. Congress
in July 2004 decertified Uzbekistan on the basis of
its failure to improve its Human Rights situation,
thereby freezing substantial portions of U.S. aid to the
country. As the events in Georgia and Ukraine show,
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the Bush administration is pragmatically supportive of
democratization efforts. Where opposition forces have
widespread public support and incumbent regimes
lack legitimacy, U.S. efforts at promoting a peaceful
regime change do take place. But where opposition
is weak and divided and incumbent regimes enjoy a
modicum of public legitimacy as in Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan, pragmatism prevails.
In sum, America has three inter-linked sets of interests in the South Caucasus, and Georgia specifically:
The building of Georgia’s statehood and democracy
is important both symbolically and practically; the
growing scarcity of energy supplies makes the Caucasus
a critical bottleneck; and the increasing importance
of the South Caucasus in regional security matters is
increasingly undeniable. All these factors combine to
make Georgia, like Azerbaijan, increasingly important
and indeed pivotal countries to U.S. National Security
interests.
RUSSIAN POLICIES
Against the background of increasingly crucial
American stakes in the South Caucasus in general and
Georgia specifically, Russia’s policies in the past several
years are a strong concern which worsened seriously
in 2006. The question constantly has been, however,
whether U.S. interests in Georgia are important enough
to warrant a more confrontational policy toward
Moscow, given the wide set of issues in U.S.-Russian
relations. In order to address that question, however, it
is necessary to put Russian policies toward Georgia in
perspective. As was discussed earlier, Russia’s policies
toward Georgia are exceptional in their boldness, even
in the post-Soviet space.

16

Russian policies toward the Caucasus in the
1990s are fascinatingly similar to its policies in the
region in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The most
direct consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union for the Caucasus was the achievement of
independence for the three South Caucasian states of
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Much as had been
the case in 1918, the Caucasian states were set free of
Russian control because of Russia’s more pressing
domestic problems and issues. In 1918, the Bolshevik
revolution needed to be consolidated before the
new leadership could embark on a reconquista of the
territories ruled by Czarist Russia. Likewise, in 1991,
the new liberal democratic Russia needed to be built
and consolidated, necessitating a loosening of the
grip on the peripheries. On both occasions, Moscow
recognized the independent Transcaucasian states
of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and for a short
period did not have any outright and direct ambitions
on them. However, both in 1920 and in 1993, less than 2
years after the respective declarations of independence
of these states, a drive to reassert control over the
region emerged. While the two periods are similar in
many ways, the differences between them are equally
important. While Bolshevik Russia in 1920-21 overran
the Caucasian states militarily and incorporated them
forcefully into the emerging Soviet Union, Russia in
the 1990s was both unable and unwilling to do so.
INDEPENDENCE AND THE RUSSIAN
“RECONQUISTA”
The independence of the three South Caucasian
states in 1991 meant a very tangible loss of Moscow’s
control over the Caucasus. Furthermore, a fourth
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republic had declared independence in the same period:
Under the leadership of former air force General Jokhar
Dudayev, Chechnya aspired to membership in the
community of independent nations, thereby seceding
not only from the Soviet Union, but also from the
Russian Federation. In spite of this direct challenge to
Russian statehood, Moscow initially focused its energy
on reasserting control over the South Caucasus, while
ignoring the Chechens’ de-facto independence for
almost 3 years. This corresponds exactly to the Russian
incorporation of the Caucasus in the 19th century:
Russia achieved control of the South Caucasus through
peace treaties with Iran in 1813 and 1828, by which date
Russian control over the region was indisputable. This
policy began with the protectorate over Georgia with
the Treaty of Giorgevsk in 1783, and was completed
by the annexation of Georgia in 1801. In the decades
that followed, Georgia was a crucial staging point for
Russian military operations in the North Caucasus,
where the small mountain peoples ferociously fought
the Russian onslaught. But the struggle continued in the
North Caucasus for 3 more decades, until the ChechenDagestani rebellions were subdued in 1859, followed
by the defeat and expulsion of most Circassians in
1864. Hence Russia securely controlled Georgia over
half a century before it established control over the
North Caucasus.
Russia’s modern-day reconquista began almost
immediately after the dissolution of the union, and
much like in the 19th century, Russia focused on
securing control over the South Caucasus before it
attempted to reassert control of Chechnya, in spite
of Chechnya being within the Russian Federation’s
borders. Moscow was involved heavily in the conflict
over South Ossetia, threatening military action against
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Georgia on more than one occasion, and played an
important role in all conflicts of the region including
providing arms to various fighting factions, often
simultaneously to both warring parties. Overtly, a
clear Russian policy towards the South Caucasus
evolved rapidly, based on three major principles: First,
the Caucasian states should be members of the CIS,
which Georgia had never joined and Azerbaijan had
not ratified; second, the “external” borders (meaning
Soviet external borders with Iran and Turkey) of these
states were to be guarded by Russian border troops;
and third, Russian military bases should be present on
the territory of the three states.15
In practice, Moscow first succeeded in asserting
control over Armenia. This was logical, given Erivan’s
rapidly developing involvement in warfare on the
territory of Azerbaijan. Turkey’s increasingly proAzerbaijani stance, and its economic embargo enforced
on the country, compelled Armenia to accept any
support it could receive—and Russia was more than
forthcoming. A military agreement was signed in May
1992, whereby Armenia complied with Russia’s three
demands. After Armenia, Russian policy focused on
Georgia. In July 1992, Moscow enforced a cease-fire
agreement between Georgia and South Ossetia which
led to South Ossetia’s de facto independence, and the
interposition of Russian troops on the administrative
border separating the region from the rest of Georgia.
Russia repeatedly had offered Georgia military
assistance conditional on its acquiescence to Russia’s
three demands.16 Shevardnadze nevertheless refused.
As soon as the guns went silent in South Ossetia,
turmoil began in the northwestern Autonomous
Republic of Abkhazia. Abkhaz leaders displayed a
self-confident attitude and claimed that Abkhazia
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was “strong enough to fight Georgia” in spite of
a debilitating numerical inferiority. (The Abkhaz
number only 100,000, whereas Georgians are over
four million, with more than 200,000 in Abkhazia at
the time.)17 As Abkhazia declared independence,
undisciplined Georgian paramilitary forces invaded
Abkhazia, committing grave violations on their way.
By October, Georgian forces faced a well-armed
Abkhaz counteroffensive, supported by heavy
artillery, North Caucasian volunteers, and air support.
The origin of these weapons was obviously Russian.
Later in the war, Russia’s blatantly direct involvement
was exposed as an unmarked fighter aircraft was shot
down whose pilot turned out to be a Russian air force
officer in full uniform.18 By October 1993, Abkhazia
had gained the upper hand militarily, evicted Georgian
forces as well as over 200,000 ethnic Georgian civilians
from the territory of Abkhazia. Again, Russia during
the entire war offered Georgia direct military support
should it consent to the three Russian demands of
CIS membership, Russian border troops, and military
bases. Georgia kept refusing, and hence lost Abkhazia
after the Abkhaz heavy weaponry stored by Russian
forces mysteriously found its way back into the Abkhaz
hands.19
After the loss of Abkhazia, a large-scale mutiny
suddenly took place in the Georgian military,
threatening to lead to the total disintegration of the
Georgian state. Shevardnadze was forced to accept
Russia’s demands, and Russian forces moved in to
help Shevardnadze crush the mutiny as quickly as
it had emerged. Russia took control over Georgia’s
Turkish border, and established four military bases
in strategic locations around Georgia: At Vaziani just
outside the capital; in Gudauta in Abkhazia; in Batumi
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in Ajaria, an autonomous republic independently ruled
by a local chieftain; and in Akhalkalaki, center of the
restive Armenian minority. Georgia, however, never
ratified these agreements, making the legal status of
the Russian military presence highly doubtful. Only
in 2006 was Georgia able to reach an agreement with
Russia on the withdrawal of its bases and troops from
Georgian territory.
The center of events during the summer of 1993
moved to Azerbaijan. A renegade military commander,
Surat Huseynov, had withdrawn his troops from
the Karabakh front, leading to the Azerbaijani loss
of Kelbajar to the west of Karabakh. Huseynov then
retreated to his native Ganja, barracking near the
Russian 104th airborne regiment’s base. The Azerbaijani
government that year had managed to secure Russian
agreement to withdraw the Ganja base by the end of
1993, despite Russian assurances that, if granted a longterm presence, the 104th regiment could be very useful
to Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia. Yet in May, the
104th regiment suddenly left Azerbaijan, leaving the
better part of its armaments to Huseynov. Huseynov’s
ensuing rebellion led to the collapse of the Popular
Front government, the loss of four provinces to the East
and South of Karabakh, and almost led to Huseynov
taking over power. Only the arrival of Heydar Aliyev,
former Communist Party boss of Azerbaijan, prevented
this, though the latter was forced to strike a deal with
Huseynov, who assumed the position of prime minister,
as well as the portfolios of defense and interior. Aliyev
implemented Azerbaijan’s accession to the CIS, and
promised substantial discussions on basing rights and
border troops, but demanded that that wait until the
war in Karabakh ended. Aliyev thereby was able to
obtain the release of armaments from Soviet military
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depots, and could now thwart the Armenian offensive
and even regain some lost ground. By early 1994, the
conflict had come to an equally hurting stalemate for
both sides, and a cease-fire was signed, which has held
ever since.
Aliyev nevertheless proved to be a master negotiator, and continued to refuse Russian border troops or
military bases. Instead, he focused on developing the oil
resources of the Caspian Sea, and sped up negotiations
with foreign, mainly American, oil companies. Hence
Azerbaijan started slipping away even before Russia
had managed to get a grip on it. Development of oil
resources with American and western companies
would not only bring Azerbaijan economic resources,
it also would increase the country’s value in western
capitals, and increase western interest in the region.
Even officially, Russia remained adamantly opposed
to unilateral exploitation of oil resources by littoral
states of the Caspian. Hence it should have come as
no surprise that only days after the signing of a U.S.$7
billion oil deal that earned the name “the contract of
the century,” Huseynov attempted another coup, this
time to unseat Aliyev. Aliyev nevertheless managed
to capitalize on his public support to deflect the
coup, forcing Huseynov to flee the country. Aliyev
thus had managed both to secure a cease-fire (albeit
a detrimental one) and to rid himself of a Russiansupported contender for power. Hence Azerbaijan did
not succumb completely to Russian influence.
One way of controlling Azerbaijan, however, was
through the very factor which could bring it true
independence: its oil resources. The only operational
pipeline able to carry Azerbaijani oil to world markets
was the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, or the so-called
“northern route.” Oil companies were to decide on
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the main export route, and faced a major challenge in
identifying the best route. The most economical route
through Iran was ruled out for political reasons: A
pipeline to the Turkish Mediterranean coast was both
expensive and dangerous, passing through or in the
vicinity of areas that were then plagued by a bloody
war between Turkish troops and the Kurdish-Marxist
separatist PKK. Clearly, oil companies would tend
to prefer the existing Russian route, which could be
upgraded for a reasonable cost to carry the envisaged
amounts of oil. However, the pipeline route passed
through Chechnya, where Dudayev was presiding
over a self-proclaimed independent state to which
the oil companies would be unlikely to entrust their
oil resources. Whereas Moscow would have preferred
to establish control over the South Caucasus before
dealing with the problems in the North, just like in the
previous century, Russian control over Azerbaijan had
now become related directly to control of Chechnya.
Numerous other factors undoubtedly intervened, but
a major reason for the timing and the imperative to
invade Chechnya in late 1994 undoubtedly was related
to Azerbaijani oil.
THE SLIPPING OF THE CAUCASUS, 1996-99
If Russia had succeeded in subduing Chechnya,
it is fairly likely that it also would have succeeded in
remaining the dominant power in the South Caucasus.
However, that did not happen. After months of
fighting that revealed the incompetence and brutality
of the Russian armed forces, Chechen rebels managed
to conquer Grozny in August 1996 in perhaps the most
important event of the Caucasus after the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. The Chechen victory and the
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humiliation of the Russian military dramatically
changed the situation in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan
increased its pro-western orientation, and investments
in its oil industry grew at a massive speed. It was joined
by Georgia, which, despite Russian troops and border
guards, developed an equally pro-western attitude
adamantly opposed to Russian imperialism. In Central
Asia, Uzbekistan joined in the chorus, with President
Islam Karimov denouncing perhaps more harshly
than anyone the imperial tendencies and policies of the
Kremlin. Western attention grew commensurately: The
United States in particular declared its strong interest
in the region by early 1997, with the EU moving in to
sponsor the TRACECA transport corridor program,
most openly by a 1998 conference in Baku fittingly
entitled the “Silk Road.”
After the miscalculations of the early 1990s, Turkey
now reengaged the Caucasian states, supporting the
restructuring of the Azerbaijani military and rapidly
developing its ties to Georgia to the level of a strategic
partnership. By 1998, Georgia and Azerbaijan openly
spoke of their aim of NATO membership, Azerbaijan
even going so far as to float the idea of NATO military
bases on its territory.20 Meanwhile, Russia desperately
hung on to its regional anchor, Armenia, delivering
among other things, complimentary arms shipments
worth over U.S.$1 billion.21 By 1999, even Armenia had
begun to question its excessive dependence on Russia,
and Armenian leaders became frequent visitors in
Washington. Imminent headway in negotiations over
Mountainous Karabakh threatened to deprive Moscow
of its Caucasian anchor, as peace with Azerbaijan also
in all likelihood would lead to the partial normalization
of Turkish-Armenian relations, and thereby reduce
dramatically Armenia’s dependence on Moscow.
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1999: Vladimir Putin and the Turning of the Tide.
If this indeed was the perception in Moscow, the
root of Russia’s weakness also must have been easy
to identify: Chechnya. It was the defeat in Chechnya
that had relegated Russia from a superpower to a
second-rate power; that had emboldened anti-Russian
and pro-western forces in the South Caucasus and
arguably also Central Asia; and that had extinguished
the prospects of the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline and
made the BTC pipeline increasingly feasible in spite
of its exorbitant price tag. In fact, it was the defeat in
Chechnya that prevented Moscow from projecting its
influence in the South Caucasus, while other powers
increasingly did so. Only by addressing the problem
at its roots, obliterating the source of instability and
restoring firm control over the North Caucasus, could
Russia reclaim its lost ground in the South. The logic
of the 19th century was now stood on its head. This
also would send a signal to the West that Russia was
not to be discounted, that the Caucasus would remain
a Russian prerogative, and that western involvement
there would take place on Russia’s terms.
While restarting the war in Chechnya, President
Putin followed a determined policy to rebuild the
Russian state. His focus was on restoring the vertical
element of power by reasserting control over state
bodies, reigning in the regions by abolishing Russian
Federalism effectively, and staffing state institutions
with individuals with a background in the security
services. An important corollary also was the refocusing
of Russian foreign policy that took place: While Russia
dismantled remaining military ties to faraway countries
like Cuba and Vietnam, it focused much more clearly
on the “near abroad,” in order to halt the slippage of its
influence across the region.
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Initially, the policy seemed to pay off. The Russian
military seemed to have learned some lessons from
its last failures in Chechnya, and moreover, the
rhetoric emanating from Tbilisi, Baku, and Tashkent
suddenly softened dramatically. Everyone’s eyes
were set on Chechnya, as leaders understood that if
Chechnya succumbed to Russian arms, Moscow’s
reconquista would not stop there—someone would
be next. President Putin also showed his diplomatic
skills. When the army was caught using vacuum
bombs on Chechen civilians, or when the executive
cracked down on the independent media, Putin
toured European capitals, telling European leaders
exactly what they wanted to hear: that Russia was not
slipping into authoritarianism, but merely needed to
establish law and order, protect itself against Islamic
“terrorism,” and crack down on corruption. The
President thereby ensured European criticism would
remain at a manageable level. Whereas the United
States would be a tougher nut to crack, Mr. Putin was
aided by America’s preoccupation with its upcoming
presidential election. It is hardly a coincidence that
Moscow’s bout of arm-twisting on Georgia in early
2001, including the cutting of energy supplies and the
introduction of a discriminatory visa regime, occurred
precisely when world attention was concentrated on
the hung presidential election in Florida. After 9/11,
of course, Putin quickly cloaked the Chechen issue in
terms of terrorism, thereby for all practical purposes
doing away with American criticism.22
In a parallel development in the fall of 1999,
the murders in the Armenian parliament killed the
peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and
made Kocharyan the sole power-broker in Armenian
politics. No evidence of Russian involvement has
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been found, yet the suspicion on the part of regional
observers of Russian involvement was only heightened
by the revelation by former Russian intelligence
officer Alexander Litvinenko—whose recent murder
in London by polonium poisoning created a rift in
Russian-British relations—that Russia’s military
intelligence services had been behind the murders.23
One of the most important elements of the policy
was to embark on a new offensive in the South
Caucasus, focusing especially on Georgia, though
initially, Azerbaijan was equally a target. Vociferous
Russian allegations that Azerbaijan and Georgia
supported Chechen separatists were voiced, claiming
without proof that a thousand Taliban fighters had
crossed Azerbaijani and Georgian territory to get
to Chechnya. Nothing to corroborate this ever was
produced. Moscow then followed up by gradually
increasing its pressures on Georgia, with a mixture of
economic and subversive levers, while normalizing
relations with Azerbaijan.
The difference between the two was related to
several factors. First, Putin and Heydar Aliyev both
had a past in the KGB and could connect on a personal
level; second, Azerbaijan was a stronger state with fewer
minority problems, making Georgia the weak link that
Russia focused on; third, a focus of Russian policy was
to split the Georgian-Azerbaijani strategic partnership
by pressuring Georgia and wooing Azerbaijan; fourth,
Russian leaders generally applied an emotional streak
to relations with Georgia, feeling that its pro-western
policy was much more of a betrayal, being culturally
closer to Russia; and, fifth, the more aggressive and
outspoken Georgian policy style mattered much in
angering Moscow, whereas Azerbaijan’s policies
were more discrete, in spite of being very similar to
Georgia’s.
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Russia’s renewed policies of reigning in
independent-minded states in the CIS showed both
continuity and change. Russia continued using and
refining time-tested strategies of utilizing ethnic
tensions and unresolved civil wars that it itself had
helped instigate to weaken Georgia. After having
imposed a discriminatory visa regime that slammed
visas on Georgians but exempted residents of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia from this requirement, Moscow
began to extend Russian citizenship en masse to the
populations of these two regions. This was followed
by a claim of a right to defend the interests of Russian
citizens abroad, militarily if necessary. Discussions
of annexation of these regions began to be heard in
Russia, primarily in the Duma; meanwhile, Russian
resistance to all efforts to internationalize mediation,
negotiation, and peacekeeping in the conflict zones
became more hard-necked. Indeed, while sponsoring
the holding of referenda on independence and similar
provocative steps in South Ossetia, as well as in
Moldova’s secessionist region of Transnistria, Moscow
began overtly calling for a “Kosovo” model to be
applied to these territories, whereby a referendum of
independence would be held, leading to the separation
of the territories from Georgia.
Seeing no audible international reaction to its
aggressive steps, Moscow in effect had dropped any
pretense of neutrality in the conflict in or around 2004.
It began appointing Russian officers to the military
and security services of the self-styled governments in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Hence Abkhazia’s defense
minister and chief of staff are both former Russian
officers; neither is even ethnically Abkhaz. Likewise,
two Russian officers serve as defense minister and
head of the security service in South Ossetia.
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All these measures indicate a continuation of the
use of the territorial conflicts to undermine Georgia’s
stability and thwart its prospects of regaining its
territorial integrity. To that, Russia added new
instruments of policy, chiefly exploiting the economic
dependence of Georgia on Russia and other post-Soviet
states like Ukraine and Moldova. Georgia’s energy
dependence on Russia was used repeatedly to pressure
Tbilisi, Moscow cutting gas supplies, often at times of
tense political negotiations over Russian bases, and even
at times when gas supplies had been prepaid, as was
the case in 2001. In 2006, coinciding with the RussianUkrainian energy crisis, supplies to Georgia were cut
after mysterious explosions on Russian territory had
destroyed the pipelines and power lines carrying gas
and electricity to Georgia—just as the price of gas had
been doubled. Only months later, Russia imposed a
total ban on imports of Georgian and Moldovan wine
(almost 80 percent of the market for both producers)
citing health concerns—the same week as a final
agreement on the withdrawal of Russian bases in
Georgia had been signed.
Following the Georgian arrest in September 2006 of
four Russian officers on charges of espionage, Moscow
broadened this to a full embargo, banning all transport
and postage links with Georgia as well as trade. Flush
with petrodollars, Moscow has poured millions of dollars into anti-government media and political figures
in Georgia, and strongly increased its covert activities
there. Now, for lack of better options, Moscow has
turned to pogrom-like harassment of ethnic Georgians
living in Russia, closing down shops and restaurants
and deporting ordinary people. Most worrisome
has been the Russian government’s decision to force
Russian schools to register and report all children
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with Georgian surnames, a blatant and obviously
unconstitutional form of ethnic discrimination.
Meanwhile, Russian foreign policy has developed
into an increasingly assertive campaign to reassert
control over the entire CIS. A first element in this was
the gradual use of economic levers, especially energy,
as a tool of Russian policy. In tandem with Gazprom for
natural gas and UES for electricity, Moscow successfully
has acquired a near-monopoly over the transport and
export of natural gas in the former Soviet Union. This
has entailed using political levers to acquire long-term
deals to buy Central Asian producers’ gas at low prices,
to the tune of $50 per thousand cubic meters; this is gas
that Russia then uses itself to free up export capacity
for gas sold to western and eastern European countries
for about $250 per thousand cubic meters—a profit
margin only possible by preventing Central Asian
producers from reaching markets independently. As
for electricity, UES has managed to acquire control
over production as well as distribution of electricity in
most CIS countries, including in Central Asia as well as
Armenia and Georgia. A favorite technique has been
the use of debt-for-asset swaps, in which state debts to
Russia are written off in exchange for controlling stakes
in strategic enterprises, such as electricity distribution
lines, Armenia’s nuclear power plant, etc.—thus
giving Russia a long-term economic influence over
these countries that no political upheavals or even
memberships in NATO or the EU, in the future, could
reverse.24
This process of reassertion of Russian might was
challenged by the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine,
which brought pro-western forces to power, alarmed
the Russian leadership that it was losing influence
rapidly, and introduced an ideological element into
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the geopolitics of Eurasia—one that it sought to
manipulate by offering to protect the regime security
of concerned authoritarian leaders faced with ever
stronger western calls for democracy. Hence by 2005,
Russia helped convince Uzbekistan’s leadership to
close down the American base at Karshi-Khanabad, and
began to work for the complete removal of America’s
military presence in Central Asia.25 In Moldova, Russia
continued to support the Transnistrian separatist
region that remained outside Moldovan control,
while exerting pressure on Ukraine to refuse western
pressures to impose customs controls on its borders with
Transnistria.26 In Belarus, as unsuccessfully in Ukraine
before that, Moscow strongly supported authoritarian
leader Aleksandr Lukashenko in his efforts to prevent
an electoral defeat.
The evolution of Russian policy in the former
Soviet space is relatively clear. From 1999 onwards,
Putin’s Russia increasingly has moved in a nationalistic
direction, and sought to prevent western encroachment
in what it views as its backyard. In the Baltic states
and Ukraine, not to mention Georgia and Moldova,
Russia has used what could diplomatically be called
“unconventional methods” to safeguard its interests
and prevent the slippage of these countries into what
Moscow views as a “western sphere of influence.”
In other words, Moscow blatantly has interfered in
the internal affairs of these countries, utilizing their
economic dependence on Russia and manipulated
territorial conflicts to undermine the stability,
independent policy formulation, and development
of these countries. The purpose of the policy seems
obvious: to maintain the dependence of the CIS
countries on Russia, making Russia the primary and
ideally sole arbiter in the international politics of
Eurasia.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST
This conundrum poses a serious challenge for the
United States, as well as for European Powers. The
South Caucasus, and specifically Georgia and Azerbaijan, are becoming increasingly crucial to western
interests for the variety of reasons mentioned above. On
the other hand, Russian policies in Eurasia generally,
and in Georgia specifically, are directly undermining the
interests of the United States. Indeed, as already mentioned, it is clear that the present Russian leadership
views its relationship with the United States in Eurasia
exclusively in zero-sum terms: Whatever is in the U.S.
interest is unfavorable for Russia, etc. On the other
hand, American officials consistently have attempted
to cloak U.S.-Russian relations in the region in win-win
terms, attempting to convince Russian officials that
America’s activities there are also in Russia’s interests
and are not in any way intended as hostile measures
against Russia.
This, objectively, may be true: Indeed, America’s toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan addressed
one of the leading stated Russian security concerns. In
return, Russia instead increasingly has called for the
withdrawal of American forces in Central Asia crucial
to this operation; thereby threatening to jeopardize
Afghanistan’s stability, which in turn would threaten
Russia’s stated security interests in Central Asia and
those of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
and Shanghai Cooperation Organization which it
purports to champion. Clearly, Russia does not seek to
find mutual interests with America in the CIS; quite to
the contrary, its policies are openly antagonistic.
This clarifies an important matter regarding
Russia’s foreign policy priorities: Russia accords
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higher importance to countering American influence
in Central Asia and the Caucasus than to the concrete
security concerns in these regions. Russian government
officials’ statements and actions indicate that they prefer
an unstable Central Asia and the Caucasus without
American presence to a stable region with a significant
element of American presence. In this environment,
U.S. efforts to seek a win-win scenario with Russia
obviously are flawed. Even issues that by our objective
thinking should seem to be in the interest of Russian
policymakers, such as a stable Afghanistan or solving
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, are not perceived as
such by them because they are perceived to advance
America’s interests.
Washington’s policies of seeking common ground
with Russia can be outrightly damaging to its own
interests. Most recently, in October 2006, at the
height of the North Korea nuclear crisis, the State
Department joined Russia in a United Nations (UN)
Security Council resolution on the Abkhazia conflict
that praised the existing Russian peacekeeping forces.
This sent all the wrong signals. To Georgia, it sent a
shock wave of worry that America was ready to sell
out crucial Georgian interests for the sake of Russian
acquiescence on a North Korea resolution. To Russia, it
sent the signal that gunboat diplomacy still works, and
that America will yield when subjected to sufficient
pressure. To the rest of the region, it exacerbated doubt
regarding America’s credibility as an ally.
Instead of decrying Russia’s flagrant violations
of international law, American and European
policymakers have found it convenient to blame the
victim. The State Department-sponsored resolution
at the UN not only praised the dysfunctional Russian
peacekeeping forces, but also blamed Georgia for
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restoring control over the Kodori Gorge in the summer
of 2006. The Kodori Gorge is a wayward part of
Abkhazia that had been under the sway of criminal
gangs, and never even nominally controlled by the
Abkhaz forces. Indeed, while American policy has
been the restoration of control over lawless regions
as such areas are understood to be a breeding ground
for terrorism, America instead castigated Georgia for
upsetting the status quo. American and European
leaders that routinely urge “caution” when talking to
Georgian leaders also counsel them to trust the work
of “peace processes” and international institutions
under the auspices of the UN and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
But these “processes” are not only moribund, they
are excuses for inaction on the part of American and
European leaders. For a decade and a half, western
leaders have chosen not to invest serious time and effort
into seeking to resolve the conflicts of the Caucasus,
including those in Georgia but also that of NagornoKarabakh in Azerbaijan. To some, these conflicts
have appeared too intractable; to others, prominently
represented in the State Department, engaging to solve
them was not worth the cost of a potential Russian
reaction. The result? Everyone entertains peace
processes that demonstrably have failed to produce
results because they are fundamentally flawed.
Little wonder, then, that Mr. Saakashvili’s
government has had enough with western urges
of restraint and caution. Georgian leaders correctly
understand these admonitions as calls to accept
a situation that keeps their country divided and
beleaguered. The same western leaders show little
interest in helping Georgia resolve these fundamental
obstacles to the building of a functioning state. Instead,
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Georgia’s leadership decided to take the initiative. It
reasserted control over the unruly Kodori Gorge and
is investing in the infrastructure of that region. It has
invested in building a functioning military force that
puts it into a different negotiating position. It has
pledged to declare the Russian peacekeeping forces
illegal unless they behave as peacekeeping forces
should. It has asked the international community for
what is taken for granted in other conflict-ridden zones
such as Lebanon: a neutral, professional peacekeeping
and police force under the UN umbrella. Meanwhile,
it has presented serious and fair proposals as to how
the two conflicts may be resolved peacefully. Instead
of lauding Georgia’s legitimate ambitions, western
leaders blast Georgia’s defense spending for creating
instability in the region, and urge it to stick to existing
mechanisms for conflict resolution, in spite of their
utter failure.
IMPLICATIONS
A number of implications flow from this analysis,
some in the field of general policy and some in the form
of concrete measures.
1. U.S. policy towards Russia needs to be reassessed.
Appeasement policies, which is what the United States
has been attempting, have failed, for the simple reasons
that appeasing a counterpart motivated by zero-sum
thinking is not possible. Indeed, far from revising
policies, so far no assessment has even been made as to
whether the appeasement policies of the past decade
have had the desired effect. Such an assessment is
direly needed, and will, in all likelihood, show that the
policies have not reached their stated goals, instead
emboldening an increasingly assertive and aggressive
Russian policy.
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2. Russia’s machinations in Uzbekistan, Georgia,
and elsewhere have been successful partly because
the United States has lacked a coherent, stated policy
toward the region, or functioning coordination
between its government agencies. This has entailed,
first, that local countries such as Georgia, Azerbaijan,
or Uzbekistan have been left guessing as to the extent
and nature of America’s commitment to their security
and sovereignty; and, second, that Moscow has been
able to exploit this incoherence to its advantage.
3. As a result, the United States needs to state its
long-term policy priorities toward this region. The
latest policy statement of U.S. interests in the Caucasus
and Central Asia was made by Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott at an address to the Central AsiaCaucasus Institute in 1997; nothing similar has taken
place since then. Presently, the upcoming Silk Road
Strategy Act II, sponsored by Senator Sam Brownback,
provides a good initiative for coordinated executive
and congressional policy toward the region. For U.S.
policy to have credibility and predictability, a policy
statement by a senior official of the administration is
necessary.
4. The U.S. Government policy toward the region, as
any other region, involves a multitude of governmental
bodies, including the White House; Departments of
State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce, and Energy;
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID);
Congress; and others. Little or no active coordination
exists at present between these, and occasionally their
interests and policies are in outright confrontation, as
is sometimes the case with the Departments of State
and Defense. The lack of coordination is painfully clear
from the Uzbekistan debacle.27 The U.S. Government
therefore should consider appointing an interagency
coordinator for Eurasia policy.
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5. In bilateral relations with Moscow, only a frank
statement of American policy and interests works;
clarity and predictability undermines the room for
Russian manipulation in Eurasia. The track record
shows that hesitance on the West’s behalf results in
Russian counteroffensives; on the other hand, Russia
normally accepts and moves on when it becomes clear
it will not be able to reverse a certain development,
as long as that does not infringe on its vital national
security interests, as opposed to its neo-imperial
ambitions.
6. America should make its commitment to Georgia’s
acceptance of Membership Action Plan status with
NATO and eventual NATO membership even more
clear than it is presently, and furthermore stress that
Russian manipulation of the “frozen conflicts” will not
affect Georgian prospects for NATO membership. The
United States also should work with European NATO
members to enlist their support.
7. America should strengthen its commitment
to the internationalization of the peacekeeping and
mediation structures in the “frozen conflicts.” The
Russian domination over the peacekeeping and
mediation of these conflicts is obsolete, reflecting the
geopolitical situation of the early 1990s, when the West
had few stated interests in this region. With increasing
American and European interests there, it is abnormal
that Russia to this day monopolizes or dominates
conflict resolution efforts and peacekeeping in the
conflict zones. The Georgian parliament’s recent efforts
to internationalize peacekeeping hence should be
endorsed and supported. Instead of bowing to Russian
interests at the UN Security Council, America needs
to work with Georgia to find an honorable alternative
that may keep a Russian contingent in place, but under
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a clear international mandate and in conjunction with
troops from third countries.
8. Concomitantly, America, in cooperation with
the EU, needs to increase its activity in the conflict
resolution efforts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and
Karabakh. It is significant that the mandate of the new
EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus has
been expanded to foresee a stronger role in conflict
resolution. America should use this opportunity to
work together with the EU in this respect. This could
include, if necessary, stepping outside of the existing
format of negotiations, such as that of the OSCE Minsk
Group in Karabakh, the Joint Control Commission in
South Ossetia, or the Friends of the Secretary General
in Abkhazia.
9. The United States and the European Powers
must vocally protest the moves toward de facto
Russian annexation of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and
Transdniestria, and state that Russian policies there
are in complete contradiction of international law and
the principles of international relations. Such behavior
on the part of Russia must be understood to come at a
cost, which presently is not the case.
10. Finally, the United States and the European
Powers should also make it clear to Russia that the use
of economic leverage for political purposes—whether
using energy dependence to undermine Ukraine or
Georgia or banning import of Georgian and Moldovan
wine on bogus charges, let alone a full-scale embargo—
is unacceptable and incompatible with Russian
aspirations to world Trade Organization (WTO)
membership, especially as Georgia and Moldova are
members.
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